HomeLatest UpdatesA Persistent and Evolving Malware Campaign

A Persistent and Evolving Malware Campaign


A visual representation of Parrot TDS landing scripts. Icons representing warning signs, links, malicious emails, phishing and threat actors. The Palo Alto Networks and Unit 42 logos.

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Executive Summary

A traffic direction system (TDS) nicknamed Parrot TDS has been publicly reported as active since October 2021. Websites with Parrot TDS have malicious scripts injected into existing JavaScript code hosted on the server. This TDS is easily identifiable by keywords found in the injected JavaScript that we will explore to show the evolution of this threat.

This injected script consists of two components: an initial landing script that profiles the victim, and a payload script that can direct the victim’s browser to a malicious location or piece of content. To help the reader better understand Parrot TDS, this article provides in-depth analysis of the landing scripts and payload scripts we have collected from this campaign.

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats discussed in this article through our Next-Generation Firewall with Cloud-Delivered Security Services, including Advanced WildFire, DNS Security, Advanced Threat Prevention and Advanced URL Filtering. If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, contact the Unit 42 Incident Response team.

Table of Contents

Background
Parrot TDS Overview
Chain of Events for Parrot TDS Payload Distribution
Parrot TDS Landing Script
Parrot TDS Payload Script
Targets of Parrot TDS
Conclusion
Protections and Mitigations
Indicators of Compromise
Landing Script Examples
Payload Script Examples
Additional Resources

Background

In early September 2023, we investigated a notification concerning a compromised website based in Brazil. Our investigation revealed that this website served pages with injected JavaScript identified as Parrot TDS. Further research uncovered many variations of Parrot TDS script from various servers worldwide.

Our research reveals several versions of injected JavaScript associated with this campaign. Before reviewing all variations of this script, we should better understand the basic nature of Parrot TDS.

Parrot TDS Overview

While campaigns involving malicious or injected JavaScript code are fairly common, Parrot TDS is notable due to its wide scope and ability to threaten millions of potential victims. This TDS is easily identifiable by keywords from the injected JavaScript, such as:

The threat operators have consistently used these keywords for Parrot TDS. The presence of these keywords makes it easier for researchers to group samples from this campaign together, making it one of the most investigated campaigns in recent years.

Although its origin remains unclear and public reports indicate Parrot TDS started in 2021, our data indicates it first appeared as early as 2019, with full samples available by August of that year. This relatively high-profile campaign would in that case have been active for more than four years.

Our investigation into Parrot TDS has revealed different versions of injected JavaScript that illustrate its evolution. Throughout its evolution, the chain of events used by Parrot TDS has remained consistent.

Chain of Events for Parrot TDS Payload Distribution

Although we have observed different versions of Parrot TDS, the attack chain follows the same basic pattern as shown below in Figure 1.

Image 1 is an attack chain diagram of Parrot TDS. Step 1: Attacker compromises a legitimate server and sets it up with Parrot TDS. Icon of attacker with arrow at server. Compromised web server song Parrot TDS. Step 2: Victim browses to compromised site. Icon of unsuspecting victim at computer. Arrow to server. Step 3: Web server returns malicious landing script. Step 4: Landing script causes victim’s web browser to retrieve payload script from payload server. Arrow to payload server. Arrow to victim. Step 5: Payload server returns payload script requested by landing script. Step 6: Payload script directs victim’s web browser to malicious location or content.
Figure 1. Chain of events for payload distribution through Parrot TDS.

In most cases, a web server compromised by Parrot TDS injects a landing JavaScript code snippet into existing JavaScript files. This code usually contains keywords such as ndsj or ndsw.

We call this the Parrot TDS “landing script” as shown above in Steps 3 and 4 from Figure 1. The landing script conducts environment checks as a way to avoid detection.

If conditions set by the landing script are successfully met, the victim’s web browser queries a payload server. This payload server then returns a JavaScript payload containing keywords such as ndsx.

We call this second script the “payload script” as shown in Steps 5 and 6 from Figure 1 above. The Parrot TDS payload script can direct the victim’s browser to a malicious webpage or other potentially harmful content.

Ultimately, the two components we have identified from Parrot TDS traffic are:

  • Landing scripts (usually containing keywords ndsj or ndsw)
  • Payload scripts (containing keywords such as ndsx)

To better understand these two components, we must first examine the landing script.

Parrot TDS Landing Script

We analyzed more than 10,000 Parrot TDS landing scripts from internal and external data sources. The range of this dataset is from August 2019 through October 2023.

These samples reveal four versions of Parrot TDS landing script that represent approximately 95.8% of the collected data as indicated in Figure 2 below. The remaining 4.2% could be the future of this campaign, since the characteristics of these samples do not match the four versions of landing script we have identified so far.

Image 2 is a pie chart of the Parrot TDS landing script distribution. Clockwise from left to right: Other is 4.2%. V1 is 0.5% is 2.7%. V3 is 18.2%. V4 is 74.4%.
Figure 2. Pie chart showing Parrot TDS landing script distribution.

The four versions of Parrot TDS landing script from 95.8% of our samples use either the keyword ndsw or ndsj, while the other 4.2% use the keyword ndsj. Scripts with the keyword ndsj use more obfuscation techniques such as Canvas, decodeURI or WebAssembly.

Most Parrot TDS landing scripts from earlier in the campaign were injected as a single line of code, often appended at the end of JavaScript files served from the compromised website. We identify this as Version 1 (V1), and Figure 3 shows one such example. Note: We will acronymize each version as V paired with its sequential version number for the remainder of the article.

Image 3 is an example of a landing script from version one. Two screenshots are stacked on top of each other. Some of the information is redacted. Highlighted in the top screenshot are the conditions, which are 1: Referrer exists. 2: the referrer doesn't contain a host name. 3: No cookie. An arrow points to the line that executes if the response contains ndsx.
Figure 3. Example of landing script V1. Source of sample: VirusTotal.

The example in Figure 3 indicates a single line of injected code, with the JavaScript normalized and beautified above it.

The different landing script versions have no significant differences in the core function of the injected script. Later versions include more obfuscation. The V1 sample from Figure 3 above shows the core function quite clearly. The sixth line of beautified JavaScript code shows an XMLHTTPRequest that interacts with the payload server and executes the response as a payload.

The major function and workflow of the landing script of V2 are almost the same as those of V1. The only difference is that V2 appends a token every time it interacts with the payload server. This token contains two random strings as noted below in Figure 4, and the token is usually 21-22 bytes long.

Image 4 is an example of version two of a Parrot TDS landing script. Arrows indicate the following from top to bottom: Generate two random strings. Two random strings to generate a token. Conditions: 1: Referrer exists. 2: the referrer doesn't contain a host name. 3: No cookie. Some of the information is redacted.
Figure 4. Example of Parrot TDS landing script V2. Source of sample: VirusTotal.

Compared to V1 and V2, the landing script for V3 looks very different. V3 includes a new function that primarily serves as storage for strings, noted as “serving strings” in Figure 5 below.

Image 5 is a screenshot of version three of an example Parrot TDS landing script. Some of the information is redacted. Arrows indicate, from top to bottom, the serving strings and the change order of the strings.
Figure 5. Example of Parrot TDS landing script V3, part 1 of 3. Source of sample: VirusTotal.

Parrot TDS landing script V3 hosts a long array of strings. Each string in the array could be a word or part of a word used by other functions to dynamically construct a keyword or string at runtime.

Also shown in Figure 5, another function modifies the string array from the previously-noted function. This makes static deobfuscation for analysis more difficult. Other than that, the core function of V3 is not much different from previous versions.

The remaining portions of our V3 landing script example are shown below in Figures 6 and 7.

Image 6 is a screenshot of version three of an example Parrot TDS landing script. Some of the information is redacted. Arrows indicate, from top to bottom: XML HTTP request.onreadystatechange. Additional parameters for XMLHttpRequest. More XML HTTP request strings. Document cookie. document.location.host name. document.location.protocol. document.refer. The xnlhttP request.net, defined in the previous section. An arrow points to the line that executes if the response contains ndsx.
Figure 6. Example of Parrot TDS landing script V3, part 2 of 3.
Image 7 is a screenshot of version three of an example Parrot TDS landing script. An arrow points to the line that executes if the response contains ndsx. A second arrow points to indexOf.
Figure 7. Example of Parrot TDS landing script V3, part 3 of 3.

Compared to V3, V4 landing scripts contain additional obfuscation and use somewhat different array indexes. V4 also implements additional changes affecting how its JavaScript handles numbers and strings. Despite these changes, V4 has the same overall functionality as V3 landing scripts.

Figures 8 through 11 below show an example of a V4 landing script.

Image 8 is a screenshot of version 4 of the example Parrot TDS landing script. Many lines of code include a functions and other arguments.
Figure 8. Example of Parrot TDS landing script V4, part 1 of 4. Source of sample: VirusTotal.
Image 9 is a screenshot of version 4 of the example Parrot TDS landing script. Many lines of code include a functions and other arguments.
Figure 9. Example of Parrot TDS landing script V4, part 2 of 4.
Image 10 is a screenshot of version 4 of the example Parrot TDS landing script. Many lines of code include a functions and other arguments.
Figure 10. Example of Parrot TDS landing script V4, part 3 of 4.
Image 11 is a screenshot of version 4 of the example Parrot TDS landing script. Many lines of code include a functions and other arguments. Some of the information is redacted.
Figure 11. Example of Parrot TDS landing script V4, part 4 of 4.

Parrot TDS landing script samples using an ndsj keyword are much rarer than ndsw in our collected data. We treat the majority of ndsj landing script samples as minor versions among V3 and V4.

In reviewing our collected landing script samples, we found other versions that do not fully fit V1 through V4 or the ndsj landing scripts. These samples include:

  • A special version that loads its payload with a Canvas object
  • Advanced versions that involve more obfuscation and WebAssembly code such as decodeURIComponent and String.fromCharCode
  • Samples that also contain injected JavaScript code from different campaigns (if a web server remains vulnerable for an extended period of time, its JavaScript files could be injected with many different snippets of malicious code)
  • Several minor versions that apply interchangeable obfuscation, such as using a number value or string value, or using [] or a period to access the property of an object – the numeric or string values can also be represented as decimal or hexadecimal numbers

While earlier samples of the injected landing script consist of a single line of JavaScript code, we observed an increasing number of Parrot TDS samples with multiple lines of injected JavaScript code since August 2022. This is likely an evasion technique, since a single long line of malicious code is easier to spot in a script file than multiple lines of shorter malicious code.

Parrot TDS landing scripts profile the victim’s web browser, and if all conditions are successfully met, they direct the victim’s browser to retrieve a payload script.

Parrot TDS Payload Script

Parrot TDS payload scripts use an ndsx keyword, making them relatively easy to identify.

Compared to the landing scripts, we found fewer unique samples of Parrot TDS payload scripts. We have classified these into nine versions, compared to the four major versions of Parrot TDS landing scripts.

These payload scripts are mostly malicious, but V1 only sets a cookie value for the victim and is basically benign. The other eight major versions of the Parrot TDS payload script are malicious.

V2 is the most common payload script, representing more than 70% of our sample set. Figure 12 shows a column chart revealing the Parrot TDS payload script distribution.

Image 12 as a column chart of the parrot TDS payload script distribution. Version two is the highest at 71.3%.
Figure 12. Column chart showing Parrot TDS payload script distribution.

V1 is the simplest version of the Parrot TDS payload script, and it merely sets a cookie that expires after one year as shown below in Figure 13. This payload script is effectively benign.

A Parrot TDS landing script will only query the payload server if the victim’s browser has no cookie set by a previous payload script. This V1 payload script basically removes the current browser from any follow-up actions for one year.

Image 13 is a screenshot of an example Parrot TDS payload script from version one. It removes the current browser from any follow up actions for one full year.
Figure 13. Example of Parrot TDS payload script V1. Source of sample: VirusTotal.

The V2 payload script is straightforward. Without any obfuscation, it creates a new script tag to load JavaScript from a malicious URL as shown in Figure 14.

This payload script is the most common version we see for Parrot TDS. Around 70% of our collected payload samples are V2.

Image 14 is a screenshot of an example Parrot TDS payload script from version one. It removes the current browser from any follow up actions for one full year.
Figure 14. Example of Parrot TDS payload script V2. Source of sample: VirusTotal.

Parrot TDS payload script V3 contains obfuscation and only targets victims running Microsoft Windows. Figure 15 shows an example of a V3 payload script.

In the bottom third of the script, ls represents a decode function that decodes several strings in the script. Our investigation revealed that V3 payload scripts will check for the following conditions:

  • A referrer
  • Acceptable URL format
  • A platform identifier of “windows”
  • That Parrot TDS had not previously set a cookie

After passing all checks, the V3 payload script functions the same as V2, loading an additional script from a malicious URL.

Image 15 is a screenshot of an example Parrot TDS payload script from version two. It creates a new script tag from a malicious URL.
Figure 15. Example of Parrot TDS payload script V2. Source of sample: VirusTotal.

V4 and V5 payload scripts are similar. V4 is effectively a V1 payload script plus additional code as shown in Figure 16.

V5 is effectively a V2 payload script plus additional code (see Figure 17). In both cases, the additional code appears before the original V1 or V2 functions.

Image 16 is a stack of two screenshots from of an example Parrot TDS payload script from version four. The bottom screenshot highlights within an orange rectangle the version one-style payload section at the end of the Parrot TDS version four payload script.
Figure 16. Example of Parrot TDS payload script V4. Source of sample: VirusTotal.
Image 17 is a stack of two screenshots from of an example Parrot TDS payload script from version five. The bottom screenshot highlights within an orange rectangle the version two-style payload section at the end of the Parrot TDS version five payload script.
Figure 17. Example of Parrot TDS payload script V5. Source of sample: VirusTotal.

With V4 and V5, Parrot TDS payload scripts involve more obfuscation, which is similar to the obfuscation seen in V3 landing scripts. The core function of this extra payload script code is to hook all clickable links in the landing page. Whenever a visitor to the webpage clicks a link, the script will create a new image object and load from a specific URL.

V6 through V9 of the payload script include more obfuscation. These are very rare in our dataset.

Targets of Parrot TDS

Parrot TDS is part of an ongoing campaign targeting victims across the globe. We see landing script or payload script samples daily from a variety of websites compromised through this campaign. While our study began with a tip about a compromised Brazilian website, the variety of compromised websites we found serving Parrot TDS indicates victims are not limited to a single industry, nationality or geographic area.

The attackers likely use automatic tools to exploit known vulnerabilities. The majority of the compromised servers use WordPress, Joomla or other content management systems (CMS) to host a website. Even websites without CMS could be compromised through this campaign, since server-side vulnerabilities are not limited to CMS.

Conclusion

Parrot TDS is a notable part of our threat landscape. This campaign has lasted more than four years, and it keeps evolving with new techniques and obfuscations. Most websites compromised through this campaign use some sort of CMS like WordPress or Joomla.

Website administrators can detect if Parrot TDS has compromised their sites by searching files hosted on the associated web server. For example, they can search server content for the keywords associated with Parrot TDS, like ndsj, ndsw and ndsx. Administrators can also conduct an audit to discover any extra .php files on a web server.

Protections and Mitigations

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats discussed above through the following products:

The Next-Generation Firewall with the Advanced Threat Prevention security subscription can help block the Webshell file traffic with best practices via the following Threat Prevention signatures: 94702

  • Advanced WildFire: The Advanced WildFire machine-learning models and analysis techniques have been reviewed and updated in light of the IoCs shared in this research.
  • Advanced URL Filtering identifies all known IoCs related to this campaign as malicious.

If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, contact the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:

  • North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42)
  • EMEA: +31.20.299.3130
  • APAC: +65.6983.8730
  • Japan: +81.50.1790.0200

Palo Alto Networks has shared our findings with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.

Indicators of Compromise

Landing Script Examples

The following are SHA256 hashes for 100 examples of JavaScript files with injected landing script code for Parrot TDS. These files have been submitted to VirusTotal.

  • 0006060d1efe85b23f68f1b6fc086ab2fd5f2d80ca2e363cd0c000fd5a175ce2
  • 000954817a815dd64b6f061fbc28a8c7919616bb1708abb58754d680772a935c
  • 00163ddc2d61a97f58b06ba35cd8b6062a81b6e2b15a9f3917358efedd40a3c5
  • 001ab3bfd48219fa355adf76006118bfc50e9ea3abaf3ff331159c21bf0c3028
  • 00278f1d3b38242b0c461b98f4ad77ee7d10c85204291c02c6c23a472613c4da
  • 00399f6e2d64aa631f5e9fe60e2da4c189535ff79e5e557b9244662866285872
  • 003bef5d2f093a8dad8cae8635d9986d023f515b799373dec008ba75490a9308
  • 003d2f4ade543f7b35999c51d06f6b3cdb0c25dc18816358f76b59698a77aa5d
  • 0044d4afd6e12e6ede2f5fe59943de23b8a986df1e8e4b2f3445dcc5c3ab8208
  • 0048c341751674cca947df44aa1319e58036ca9192415ed63ab8b5a2413e031c
  • 004be99a81506cc2ed4e94a667bb6771140c84a51f61902a24a55b2fd265af29
  • 004d8253f02277ac50955aa0ef6c1a460ce798d94201959079ecdf35dc2f4c63
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  • 0050e225e781ee415fae74108108de3200eb3010e2c77e8d265882d3e9c7399c
  • 0054bc9d7a5fc4d630c79d3641ac32f65ab3e61c9c82ad2edca6dcab5a050c65
  • 0059da8643270d09d5b60ea2bbd0d459d6ce54cd54e27facbd8a9b748643fa4b
  • 006154fbc565b387c800206323d80b61fd4a16525fbfc682ae1d7c458aceab58
  • 006a7ae01c1b1939ada3639e59ce8513aa489cd9f59f80a20205e4474ecf0082
  • 0073932eece5b9817b80d1fe1c219a72f0b8d3764039e3313672d938b14f2d8e
  • 00789e764859a749d79a1927e070e2959473f0cf6e0ca2be5b0f666a4e8926c1
  • 007a56bddc9c2171771bcbb654b85b8039c3342ac83fdb060bc2f24d1c5d8814
  • 0087f64098d10cce64219f8456702611e462ab755c4e5cc2e4d719add810e98c
  • 00a23761ffe9a3cefb79be72155354305116d0f60f41b01b0d2f37cbce61d9a5
  • 00be4cae7ccf629d22c6c9c1842341309eac1eb9e7e83ed1ab28997f3c3d4e96
  • 00bf309f513ee8c46435433bf8f1ec19527d16b4f976da1403f8fb753506571a
  • 00bffe2fabe6a57a21d912f4111bd9451e388adcebb1d023fa2c3fe079aad24d
  • 00c11daf1c18160eba63de3b2d712cc8c0abe457f993cc2f81f8c746fc970c12
  • 00c28bfec1fe8ecd139c06791293298430353e449115ef712fdcaae57e35f46f
  • 00dabc4c7753c6b608a8889f9d1367edca1bc2c3b6e92744e0b50abca33b8a87
  • 00ddbc6dc6b571681fae2c4a2d72cd9a7129ee800f326e33279cb337fafc93ce
  • 00df68a21172ddb20bde5bce4606b814022e4bba5fdc5cac457b7f1643f625ff
  • 00ec04f09b4c045e2b95f0ac4723a58457522e3c39fb6157e8d4213c12be0540
  • 00ee956dd06c3a14962c1ea8c447cc2d3e63a28c486dc0bd50e535674ae63c56
  • 00fb7abeb8464e01fe3043b2544bd71a82a9466c5c3ac6b954e62e87314d585a
  • 010622ece3ec9199668bfd2d1637149ede9c242e9672a7531cdaab86da849f77
  • 010fde6958e0107c2d543b2d6afbe492efbfa5fd44cd0a75185c779f31e16df9
  • 01124a700f6984062f26e34dff117b87b7d269557817a7241fa1d00ad5d780a0
  • 011478985c03b81ed04d6d4ce598baf3f7d48aa6e3a58f24de0e74bfe0cadd3b
  • 01235cf8181552124cbd76232607f1a60e8f82c48e0f013765ad6bda59b34e01
  • 0124566011742f850ed029a1aaa11a08ca00bd7f9775df45b0a9bc8740e89c04
  • 0126c6520a793efe328e9820dcbc9d42732f4cfb4b6fd25919d07e7b6c23c781
  • 012830c380ec979ab925b9bed84e6052e2ff5259409fc0bbc49b544e8030b19c
  • 0128a7881e686a5e291fcbd93644d8e670f98802412a5338701222dc5f9a28ca
  • 012b2cfe603de4ade7370ae7ba585e36c818c4193341b488872a4dbdd07bcc2d
  • 01366391de90229ac2b8a7269a4a42df9bd1709f51aece7164ffa4531f518811
  • 0137d093587fb1f42985ca271c8d2d1d601da410168491b66b154d4d003d332c
  • 013f3f2248ad31ebd52e1cf5c139d13bab6690734248bc2a6c83f06fbe43260c
  • 0141c2fe63d36c43558b67f0b884389366b13da3e9f68897b147a445f3328442
  • 01425b3c993e51d80f4e3b5a8f949b25e4fb30e9e9377507ac8b4fd3b7a69ff9
  • 0143d1989d04d70fc035e7eba21ef46b27f2673fd3a7e9df78a802179c33105d
  • 01585ae455c2bbe6471d718bcf845eca55f80e24963d562d847f81eafc672ec1
  • 0159a56803cebaf1544a44e3cee01df30505afb390b83371fa8cbb1d46353800
  • 01660ed180b9d0e4e19d7da313cd8ca818211ce36948eb31742e3da85a51580f
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  • 017ff4946dd00acc0da7ddc48e23c9736f735e2dcf0a83cb5613b433fca1960c
  • 018087b1bac5e86f4b6dce4d8c5fdc77c53b96280fe37342a74585e89b9b9665
  • 018f392c9cbf6640dae7d457b33be7d81a08612c911add177c7c5bb39876efc7
  • 01a482c79849908879a39eeacf77078b531f29e5d86c9e9f578a97b2313c98fe
  • 01af830f79aad912bd8a3438bc9e914e159a112df657a1610f50527304657139
  • 01b8b7cf7a93077119aa5062554bb662be230b2e2655a8e53b44b482f4c73a3a
  • 01be768e7bc9ef499ec5b37e4dffecfaab9346489d27b1d6de3b9a67db584e2d
  • 01dc27a4be3f69ebba64a71afde7a4158436b2a423174c6a2196efe9342a870c
  • 01dd3fed62220c53eb9208ab00d0fcce62cf76841e532a9474da5ed47563b978
  • 01de1c2f03c920ac64e73dfdbca363c1f8888534981c6215365b2514b9192f93
  • 01eb0535321d4d1ef0d5f5b3dbb91c341b75e8dbd129c40801c26abcf650331f
  • 01ec9cf7d9cba1294a8dd4803766c37bf20c4cd57d5ae26d990083076d170ea1
  • 01eed0382a2938c7733fc823ee43b2414116237e5793789dafa274e451d1dd75
  • 0203c29fe1c34417e158624fe4f352513f076302b1179a854a5351613b75b9bf
  • 020e6aa377b6ef4ef45efe0906b3b5dfdfe7381099a8fa080a58a457eaef934e
  • 0214510764fee618b8fe18aeb72f643218dde5252d1d568f0fad735ea861f1a8
  • 021519c6b0c63ccadd416fddbabc28001f1b6e8c09cac93a076a013cb98d3afb
  • 021a5e6f490622bbc79d0d42b444ccc856b4e8cfcb77df3d01bad9c8f1177a3b
  • 021a60787a1d4acdfa44fd27510e6aaa6305807c48e8209c892458e43d360323
  • 021cd5b198f6bbf78aacb3f716a7f3355cdac98d835d493b6cb85ee4b9adc8a0
  • 02216dfca8323263933ff53130796d3a445e44251f02c241d95c6bc0f81721cc
  • 022668b33b118e73d391aaf790bd06bb3bb03dc13b58a28a70dde3dc485ecf5b
  • 022feae2851e7993780e08ea328e36521e91c695f3a5304e0dd1df678d7f6c3b
  • 0237268899c037aaee7bde29e28a08f89230e92bbef33dbf0f17ad58ee53af55
  • 023dcc38a7a55f941818aa307203216c6eaf50f8fed529a4c636a89f70119717
  • 0250e4baf4fbd9aba84b25968a7debd4ce83360e0ebef03d5ccbb24f9e17ecf8
  • 0252b75589fe832eb103d64ed7f5e1dcb6417babd6e290c34c79093ff312092f
  • 0255da103745a213d50a2d86770d5381add6bd84bea41edd93ac746c019565ca
  • 025cf7e1e1f39c001c627cf42be1be14ef52a42f760e03db922246a7b114aec1
  • 026cb95e6b415355767655b9f706e1c1f9bf20b242e65aa47b8e1279068f718f
  • 027079961030e5af9bb7382acb2c6b19221b41255f801be540c07b484cded4d7
  • 0270d194a2d4499468b8461796e1cb3d1af301df6b12c2b7193a8baef8c13ce3
  • 0279bd4320fb5025a9d740bbdd0cf2aafb477d684af4ea1ca0e83bab424527fa
  • 02868c886de5090362c6d503e6549e65fbe975f1fa03ddfb18fb0432f5f6bfb4
  • 028d5b2992d88d52ea9e80625e25c324b665fb784bfa9daec3ebba16d01a8348
  • 029415b96774d15e7e2acd2ed45907f67617217345a6aea1fdf65fdb4353e52b
  • 029c44784556ca319015548c3dbeb92b025ed72f918d1d8245b6a6a321a64b7c
  • 02b2312ce68bc4ac2c59ee905b23f8f9d2dfb3fd0f38b5ef896f59e6d74834f8
  • 02b467d42c7d26cdc480ead7c678c2930dc315882caf5531a3e3d503b118d5ad
  • 02c5ebe4418bad22a508f0d430ca1ec6b3d419011f94041b70ad636c89e98980
  • 02d7c155eef3da89d00ecf3718084c361675f3ccd84162cc00f2d4124b9a2346
  • 02e141ad62fc2f8514cdd8221be61f68a9d13de939fa850c4185154538d7c9fb
  • 02f5e9ff5293fd5855d35337e8bb3e3a03b47afa7e71a06de2f8cfd557f4f0d6
  • 02f7b2f58da74dde5a1f09b2492c8f6fa56bb009900378feaf057e6577de8a2f
  • 02fbcc9f2971840c5381b1e0f5052b1067c82ea353e7d2ec6810d001ce25dfff
  • 02fcddc3c5383b505fa9babc3fce93118abedcb7203b8921933f815eb7c7a879

Payload Script Examples

The following are SHA256 hashes for 100 examples of JavaScript files with injected payload script code for Parrot TDS. These files have been submitted to VirusTotal.

  • 0009fe8aa339fb489abcfd711d5c7b2a70b7d57ae55aae3922669f72cbf5964f
  • 0234918db61115aaa0c3be708084dae30feee8d97a41a011e3fbb06d745c496c
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  • 09e06b3fa2194b76a1e73483614ec3f3ab076c55134c3d45e7ac9ea452e51176
  • 0a10157a920b190fb2fba6b6df34e12fd4532e52bc71700b9cefa73f95e60fe6
  • 0cf4f33985dff5e1e7d37d8d5485b3561ffa42d0a31acec10321cdc28c31abdf
  • 0f20659f7cea84ef3b1def6c54555454b1820fd8adf9866b2ea3ed18e341babb
  • 0f334075e5379be32d176048287ea8b787d524e34630509a74ec4cd90fc1b0dd
  • 137bb7784088669d1432243831896cfe5b5fc02d7f207de26d16220b38335c90
  • 174fb6597444ff6d7d59d2981f6aad54c99e763a6123d52319bb2d0ba84bfd29
  • 175a0bb57ec0e0a5728b7f8455a968861dc50c42a1ce8eb437d8b98fd394ea47
  • 1ab04ee02b5359662c26c4c1f10f711d707ac23293193cbcba3cc84d0d070000
  • 1c8bbb02dd1fd46e442caad6fba174b966ea5bd9d27d6315991b904792693d54
  • 1ca06df44cce9aa64294a8e55c41e654ab6b766ab76faa39a34363cce4e83e08
  • 1e01bf738bc665f149b0793af461a43f4330ecf99dd068e2b7abd038c46ef417
  • 1e5ca993bc0afee9eb23436ea2e0bfbede934ce2be850d3122cc429fd73d01c1
  • 1e6d8d031bbb4a4e15f8c15941dc27944e62727116338957306db9610351911a
  • 20f9cd4ef8616afb8a62eabf6ca1c252c54021dc03ba621bab2e00db8fb6bbc1
  • 21114a66a1934b806a8b1b76f924fdb9876047316ba8d26c2ac94c1b0e908cb5
  • 244221e80cbc510ea4e62f49fc1a377dcc5365899c2f92f7807b91cdeb20476d
  • 25786bcc47e97d9e55588b4e2962aeb9760cd546629bb5fd08799ba8c9e8d027
  • 25af4cd7c60671f1af9bbf17441b8951b8751ee1299dd7fa97ba4afd6021642c
  • 25e4bc712d895d8bfce72fab30eef25da18591979c672d1fbd976bac2e0cf1ca
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  • 2726854efc42c00d7064abf99ef451d05975e7461c42e7897ba1b0c6336f153e
  • 2c961d64aeefe73c43a96739c52047fd1f39af5af86e388689531cdd83b00045
  • 2c9eafa9914032112c170e3dc12d40c03ee1e873bade8bfed36b6a7759ff1dd5
  • 2dd1db4ff9da32d73ac876e513f20c1da6d83031969f645e3e014e96134a8aac
  • 2f9e5ea05aa8cd81c1c1f0914220557c5dc4a8bc42ee822bd327e3cfc3328f45
  • 2ff953a5d7e760ad4d4a06d2ad68d43c42f388a9c6fb6e9d0c6341dd05c33374
  • 3032a2affd7d9a3dd9418b3fab3c88af2bc0f71e3baaad8e478ec85af569c912
  • 31562bdf22a927837f6fdb333e72bc3cf8da067143cb3d99663ce7224d0f8901
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  • 34fdb99c3e895a66c814aedf6e29c075ee5fac7aa1190903759ec08766bee28c
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  • 41c4914a2cda7a9c3deb0a85a17c9f964c95dc1e0dbdfd8727d7d7ebaed3c66f
  • 44ba1192916ccc51c0bda43aa9a40d3ebb7f8480ce2554092ec2198e99e2f9ea
  • 474a0fa3ecddd9a7eef503c10a6e09f34384c7a301e6ba92474c8b809aff841a
  • 4f0d9b754402ac02b36b470e93cb712724a2c505c798d3cb8d23662c1303e4f2
  • 539ecf094f122790b157415933bb0122417015fff914a848ff5b83d1c3ce69eb
  • 53ca5aaf4786aa235795c9b4a2648bed523f38d115a5791bd26b3e22e9e6f109
  • 53e703d262af2c91d8be81ca0e32c7f9b3dbc8b6d571ad3a480bff020a8cae04
  • 54774aef9a494e29a072bc729f8482fba6dc530a045d40e4453d61beac8d8355
  • 56514cfce2dd75f2dafeebf385bc827bd1b7392f65bac98ec9791526f724fd66
  • 5666d18866973f608cccf95c7dbf56d56bb3027121af701bd779f9ab794c53b1
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  • 5f87cdf1ccd448d8f90b79d80153fbae143ec9dfa1c79a5ba9193609975d0d35
  • 5f9fa969df10a03d38c26050655645c0b8cd00c4ae35b62d9e355815ef722b21
  • 5fd89dab9bcdcd783ae96c0b42f5761d2d24a6192d730040a50ffb4b5c95850a
  • 6168dc254c4c6dd6a5461c56fd1fdb65821f04d9ac23e4d70b62d447ce77971d
  • 61c76044609b8f522546991b2683239bba734ca290981e5ed25099f46312fd04
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  • 6385e6004a9d11485d076f2b9b79b2ddf468b629aef0f66c22c7bffa3d7ebc3a
  • 638fd2159534b7b180ef2ca0633f6ee5d09af8cddbac758e1cde1ca6aec1ca8c
  • 63f48e94e38c7b5e441c3aeb0c74141bd6d7fc7ab03a345d09d67c8e8b871ca9
  • 6fed7c758e0484b53fd3efaa622b609052dcf5ad34768181d3ff8e22cb6e6e2f
  • 732457475da8c47cf211f5eb3a6529c9aa8976ce26d50f2e90422278c2160d5e
  • 738f775e1031402f228c1246d10d9c13af1d461596319bea87f8b20d085349cd
  • 73e5dc70d286c24265f71de61016404934991d0b41c4962420c1490469111b4e
  • 778f4a8f061efea0efca1669c4eb0f26c7d1cc02e003fc01f43ddba328ebfc92
  • 7ab4fce62ebf632bca176894152a88e38965708bffdae4357a8b6c6defa1724d
  • 7accd14f469d79c4539c5887faf79407e6a06111612d2b63eb9f34c5afe7c74f
  • 7e9feda6e593b6d7e3c15032edb0cd3e2d1ec585d8f5691e951ac70059ce4240
  • 801626f005b40b0ef889f93c64f991e53318393fb0efdd30bb30185a12cb7480
  • 817af2e8193d3a226dad46bef33e55a56b3a56ff035cc0e68067e2eb61975dc5
  • 81d99d01f6909a2ae027e3a0d792b7c517b312fcf2cc03228c2a5348ad796582
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  • 86b84a35d28207783bd79e34f6f2e687e6e38fd9fb78df90b1cc7e6f302e0084
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  • 87fb8a757f5de0f4cb4f8b4f568068e8c12f376562b1f5d1df118b4dc3076564
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  • 92322cc99cc5bd84bd1f06de8412b7f907e03a66489d147a1d3a77b2d3b0aacb
  • 9707f57ca55e1f0cc975488ab10188f885589db427beef7df9adc3bd4e95bd62
  • 98a230f8bed756447d8f8dcfb1485e395068eae511ca7b3a10049848427682af
  • 9bbafb672ee8f9c8eec8ee111962db7aa49e6e91f2fc3a23b0d5f32152f5101b
  • 9be661e3218290ebd4de59037d1360f4bec7e2f521d09a063da994d838160fce
  • a0b928edf0cf8efba7d2b2edcc43419ec7568d70717ba44ffc6c24fb9ebb9464
  • a1dab97450e66028c0f1e62620354cd9d71b99d1517f7cceef59c4c0a5de44f6
  • a226f8878b2c440932c5d9e215384733226d3942efecbb05f84cb34555c99e9f
  • a296db98c85c21b8f4c60a651a56aa745385d769f76c4f35e7f8cef6ee16c841
  • a6b8f4094bf162b6007006b51aad4f1fe4930e1bf458d6d47ebe7047f8895039
  • af84372409235ad5f716b758b24e384f3506d771bad4460676de9ea3c375e9d7
  • b07c3cbacb4d238e209aabc19754852c536ba708ee4b19fd8fbc32580a7e119a
  • b14ba04ffc4b680225cc76912317570c09f06e8c6cec1a4b2092cbbff0668bd4
  • b727b3fe958407787c9929fef59b6735861be12ebcf8c72aa6ed7b9cfa6829c6
  • bc1d29c3ac08b1a4f30b3f4930dc5e07bdeb0ba55cfe7ad684021a63bf72db71
  • bc88f6e79d49242e16cb30b64d1b8948c7d9333785476b4e8d24f82403290454
  • be8bf730a23766f917c1f90e79bbd23c76b7a12572eeda4bc38ff46ce17f9c9a

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